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Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one
hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive
and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a
moralmodel which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behavior under the
control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular con-
sumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain structures and functions known
to be involved in the motivation of behavior. On this evidence, it is often concluded that
becoming addicted involves a transition from voluntary, chosen drug use to non-voluntary
compulsive drug use. Against this view, proponents of the moral model provide ample
evidence that addictive drug use involves voluntary chosen behavior. In this article we
argue that although they are right about something, both views are mistaken.We present
a third model that neither rules out the view of addictive drug use as compulsive, nor that
it involves voluntary chosen behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The view of addiction as a neurobiological disease characterized by
compulsive and relapsing drug use has come under renewed attack
by several philosophers and psychologists (1–7).1 Their critique
is partly empirical, partly conceptual. According to the empiri-
cal criticism, the disease view is not supported by the empirical
evidence appealed to by its proponents. This includes biological
evidence of changes to the normal operation of the brain caused by
regular consumption of drugs as well as observational evidence of
addicts’ repetitive self-destructive behavior. But this is insufficient,
the critics claim, to warrant a conception of addiction as a disease.
The biological evidence is of neurobiological correlates of drug
use such as increased levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine,
but these correlates are common to most forms of pleasurable
experience (2, 3, 5). Sweet food, lottery prizes, sex, and exercise all
create strong desires oriented toward some reward, and all essen-
tially involve the same type of brain changes. There is nothing
pathological about strong desires.
The second type of empirical evidence relates to the alleged
compulsive patterns of self-destructive behavior often observed in
addicts, and frequently accompanied by strong ambivalence: the
addict expresses a desire not to consume drugs prior to, after, or
even during the drug intake (8–11). The assumption is that this
reveals the neurobiological effects of drug use to be significantly
different from the seemingly similar effects of other desired activ-
ities or goods. Whereas strong desires ordinarily do not remove
a person’s ability to control her behavior, addictive desires do,
so the argument goes. Against this, the critics point out, there
1The disease view of addiction was also criticized as part of the earlier “anti-
psychiatry” movement in the seventies [e.g., (49)], though this criticism seems to
have had less impact on the general view of addictions in psychiatry and psychology.
is plenty of evidence that addictive behavior involves voluntary,
intentional, even rational actions. Indeed, under close scrutiny
the drug-oriented behavior of addicts is shown to be less unusual
than it may appear: it is influenced by a variety of incentives such as
financial concerns, fear of arrest, values regarding parenthood, etc.;
studies of addictions in the general population find moreover that
most addicts quit drugs by their mid-30s, often without assistance
(2, 4). How drug users describe loss of control depends variously
on the appearance and characteristics of the person surveying
them (12), and if we are to believe the experimental evidence it is
the believed alcohol content rather than the actual alcohol content
that influences how much alcoholics drink. Such evidence, it is
argued, shows both that addicts can be persuaded to exercise their
capacity for self-control if they are given what appear to them to
be sufficiently good reasons, and that statements regarding loss
of control are – at least to some extent – factually inaccurate and
motivated by a desire to shift attribution of behavior from choices
to circumstances.
Of course, nobody denies that addicts tend to pursue behav-
iors associated with risk and self-harm. But so do people who eat
junk food, drive over the speed limit, have a sedentary lifestyle
or practice base jumping. It seems excessive to argue that all
such instances of risky, potentially harmful behavior are involun-
tary. The reason people often engage in such behavior is because
they consider the benefits outweigh the costs. The ambivalence of
addicts toward their addictive behavior is less typical of those purs-
ing these other risky behaviors, but this too might have another
explanation: given the stigma of addiction, proclaiming a desire
to quit and helplessness in the face of “addiction” could be a func-
tional device – something addicts just say, either because they are
self-deceived or because they wish to defer responsibility for their
socially unacceptable behavior (2). Some critics of addiction as
www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 77 | 1
Henden et al. Addiction: choice or compulsion?
disease believe that “addicts,” as we tend to think of them, do not
really exist; there are only people who make bad decisions (7).
The conceptual critique of the disease view questions what it
means to say that addiction is a “disease” that is characterized
by “compulsive” and relapsing drug use. How can we reconcile a
view of addictive behavior as a disease with a view of behavior-
in-general as a choice? How do they differ and why? Clearly, one
difference is that addiction involves behavior which in some sense
is “out of control.” But in common usage, the notion of “out of
control” ordinarily represents a continuum, ranging across cases
of non-voluntary, non-intentional behavior, such as reflexive knee
jerks, to cases of highly voluntary, intentional – even rational (in
a welfare-maximizing sense) – actions involving self-harm due to
ignorance or lack of foresight. Where along this continuum should
addiction be placed?
Critics of the disease view assume that the notions of “dis-
ease”and“compulsion”commit its proponents to locating it closer
to the non-voluntary end of the continuum, while the empiri-
cal evidence, they argue, in fact suggests a location closer to the
rational end (2–4). They appear to have two main reasons for
this contention. First, while symptoms of typical diseases such as
Alzheimer’s or cancer are biologically based and non-voluntary in
the sense that they do not develop as the result of decision-making
processes but are beyond the person’s capacity to volitionally influ-
ence, this is not so in the case of the repetitive drug-oriented
behavior of addicts. Although this behavior is the most promi-
nent symptom of addiction, its development is clearly affected
by decisions made and is volitionally influenced (4). It is flexible,
adaptable, and involves elements of planning. Second, to claim
that addictive behavior is compulsive means that it is caused by
irresistible desires (2, 4–6). Irresistible desires, however, should not
be affected by the presence of competing incentives. After all, the
notion that“nothing else can compete” is a defining feature of irre-
sistibility. Nevertheless, addictive behavior is clearly influenced by
incentives.
In our opinion, these arguments show that a certain strong ver-
sion of the disease view should be abandoned. However, we want to
argue, another – weaker and more plausible – version of this view
is still available. This view places addiction closer to the middle of
the above-mentioned continuum. Our argument – and our arti-
cle – has three parts. First, we argue that behavior can be compulsive
even if it is not caused by irresistible desires. In support of this, we
present evidence that demonstrates that behavior is commonly
categorized as “compulsive” in clinical practice even if it is not
caused by irresistible desires. Now, some critics of the disease view
have taken the observation that addictive behavior is not caused
by irresistible desires as a springboard to suggest that addictive
behavior must in fact be ordinary rational behavior instead. The
most systematic development of this view of addiction as ordinary
rational behavior has taken place in the economics literature. In the
second part of the article, we argue that the causal mechanism pro-
posed by advocates of the so-called“rational addiction theories” in
economics is both theoretically implausible and empirically false.
Ambivalence is pervasive in addiction and irrationality appears to
be the hallmark of addictive behavior. In the third part we return
to the question of what constitutes addictive behavior as com-
pulsive. If it is not the irresistible desire, what is it? We would
like to present an alternative view, one based on a long tradition
in philosophy and psychology. According to this view, addictive
behavior is compulsive because it counterfactually depends on a
motivational mechanism that systematically causes dissociation
in the addict’s decision-making machinery. While the mechanism
does not remove the addict’s ability to control her drug-oriented
behavior, it sharply increases the effort she has to make to take
advantage of alternatives to drugs compared to non-addicts. This
view, which fits well with recent evidence in neuroscience, is not
only consistent with the claim that addictive behavior is character-
ized by compulsive and relapsing drug use, it is also consistent with
the claim that addiction involves voluntary, intentional behavior
that is motivated by the addict’s decision-making processes.
ADDICTION AND IRRESISTIBLE DESIRES
In a recently published book, Heyman argues that addiction is
not a neurobiological disease because addictive behavior devel-
ops as the result of addicts’ decision-making processes and thus is
within their capacity to volitionally influence (4). Although Hey-
man is clearly correct in saying that addiction involves voluntary
behavior, that does not rule out a view of addiction as a mental dis-
order – which is its current medical diagnosis (13). This is worth
mentioning, not least because few would claim that the symp-
toms of mental disorders necessarily develop independently of the
persons’ decision-making processes and beyond their volitional
influence. The whole point of psychological therapy depends on
the ability in at least some of the victims of mental disorder to voli-
tionally influence the symptoms of their disorder and learn how
to exercise that capacity by attending psychological therapy. In
other words, if addiction is a mental disorder, there is no obvious
reason why we should be committed to the view that the symp-
toms of addiction – i.e., repetitive drug-oriented behavior – must
be non-voluntary or unresponsive to incentives. Now, compulsion
is clearly a symptom of mental disorder, but to what extent is it
correct to view addictive behavior as compulsive? This, obviously,
depends on how we define compulsive behavior.
The point of departure in most philosophical discussions of
compulsive behavior is not diagnostic practice in psychiatry, but
rather a concern with the metaphysics of free will. It has been
commonly assumed that compulsive behavior involves a loss of
freedom of the will.2 Many philosophers have therefore tended
to conceptualize compulsive behavior as analogous to instances
of interpersonal compulsion where someone is forced by some-
one else to act against her will. They have therefore tended to
treat the notion of “compulsive behavior” as analytically equiva-
lent to “compelled behavior” (2, 14–17). In the interpersonal case,
the “compelling agent” is another person, while in the intrap-
ersonal case it is an irresistible desire. A reasonable question is
whether this conceptualization is consistent with the defining
features of compulsive behavior used as diagnostic signposts in
clinical practice.3 If it is not, metaphysical analysis will clearly be
2The notion of “free will” is, of course, notoriously difficult, and there is little agree-
ment on how it should be analyzed. For present purposes, we assume that a person
has free will with respect to a particular action at some time if she has the ability to
refrain from that action at that time.
3In psychiatry the term“compulsion”is, of course, used to refer to a kind of symptom
of many different disorders. When we use the terms “compulsion” and “compulsive”
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of little use for understanding real world behavior categorized as
compulsive (as opposed to behaviors in philosophical thought-
experiments). Clinical descriptions of compulsive behavior tend
to emphasize a number of features (18–20): first, compulsive
behavior is strongly cue-dependent in the sense that it is regu-
larly triggered by certain situations, places, or people associated
with the type of behavior in question. Second, compulsive per-
sons feel repetitively driven to perform the behavior, often in
spite of themselves; reports of feelings of compulsion are there-
fore common. Third, if compulsive persons sincerely try to refrain
from acting upon their compulsive motivation, achieving success
becomes, they report, increasingly difficult over time. These factors
are present in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and impulse-
control disorders (ICD) such as kleptomania (compulsive steal-
ing), trichotillomania (compulsive hair-pulling), and compulsive
buying. But is this kind of compulsive behavior consistent with the
philosophical view that equates compulsiveness with irresistible
desires?
In order to answer the question, we need first to be clear about
what it means for a desire to be“irresistible.”4 A desire is irresistible
at some time t to a person S if S is unable at t to resist act-
ing on that desire. Put differently: if a person’s action was caused
by an irresistible desire, it was literally impossible for her to not
perform that action. However, there have been different accounts
of precisely what kind of powerlessness this implies. Very gen-
erally, these accounts can be divided into two main groups. The
first group covers what might be called “desire-centered accounts,”
accounts which seek to explicate powerlessness in terms of the
abnormal strength of the desire to perform the compulsive action.
This desire is presumably so strong that no other motives can real-
istically compete. The second group, includes what might be called
“control-centered accounts,” they seek to explicate powerlessness
in terms of a loss of normal capacity for rational self-control. Let us
quickly run through some examples of each of these account cat-
egories and see if they can adequately characterize the compulsive
behaviors associated with clinical cases of compulsion.
Starting with the desire-centered accounts, they can be further
divided into non-normative and normative versions. According
to the non-normative desire-centered account, the compulsive
person’s powerlessness is seen as an inability to resist acting on
a desire because this desire, in virtue of its abnormal physical
strength, is the immediate cause of the bodily movements made
by the person in performing the compulsive behavior; no choice
or decision has been made to make these movements. As one
writer puts it, the appropriate interpersonal analogy to compul-
sion according to this view, is the thug who literally tosses me
out of the room; just as I cannot help the way my body moves,
so the compulsive person cannot help the way her body moves
(21). On this account, compulsive behavior is non-voluntary and
in what follows, what we have in mind will be the sort of repetitive physical behavior
performed in characteristic circumstances that is typically referred to as “compul-
sive” in the clinical literature. We do not mean to suggest that compulsive behavior
in this sense is a symptom of all compulsive disorders, nor that there is one specific
mechanism that explains all observed varieties of compulsive behavior.
4By “desire” we mean in what follows cognitive desire, i.e., a motivating state that
involves some favorable representation of the state of affairs that one acts in a certain
way (e.g., as desirable, pleasurable, enjoyable, or good).
non-intentional. Compulsive people are powerless because they
are physically incapable of refraining from their compulsive behav-
ior. This account seems at odds with what is standardly referred
to as compulsive behavior in the clinical literature. Compulsive
behavior in clinical cases seems intentional and related to active
choice. As one researcher remarks, in typical cases of OCD the per-
son often carries out her compulsive behavior quite deliberately,
taking particular care to carry it out precisely as she feels it ought
to be done. If, for some reason, the behavior is disrupted, she will
experience it as invalidated and in need of being restarted (19, 20).
This suggests that the behavior can easily be delayed, reshaped,
or substituted. Furthermore, there seems to be a growing con-
sensus in the clinical literature that persons with OCD engage in
their compulsive behavior in order to temporarily reduce the dis-
tress or anxiety associated with some obsession (18, 22). Usually
they report a fear of disastrous consequences if the behavior is
not properly carried out. There is clearly then an element of both
purpose and control in OCD behavior that is at odds with seeing
the behavior as non-voluntary and non-intentional in the sense
implied by the non-normative, desire-centered account.
In contrast to the non-normative, desire-centered account,
under the normative desire-centered account, the compulsive per-
son’s powerlessness involves an inability to resist acting on a desire
because the desire coerces her to choose the compulsive behavior
(15, 23). This implies a normative notion of the strength of desire
since what counts as“coercion”depends on what an individual can
reasonably be expected to hold out against. The claim made by the
normative desire-centered account is that the threat of unbearable
psychological pain motivates the compulsive person in a way sim-
ilar to how the threat of grievous bodily harm allows a robber to
coerce his victims into handing over their money.
Though less starkly at odds with the clinical literature on com-
pulsive behavior than the non-normative account, this account –
too – fails to fit the facts. While compulsive persons clearly experi-
ences distress in trying to refrain from compulsive behavior, there
is little evidence to suggest that these feelings generally reach the
level of “unbearable psychological pain.” Many researchers appear
to believe, for example, that typical ICD-s, such as compulsive
buying, are carried out to provide temporary relief or escape from
feelings of general tension, whether it be depression, boredom,
frustration, or some other negative mood state, often generat-
ing in the process certain soothing or pleasurable sensations (18).
Whether preventing a person, on these occasions, from experienc-
ing relief and pleasure – while no doubt unpleasant – is sufficient
to create “unbearable psychological pain,” let alone a sense of
“threat” similar to the robber’s threat of bodily harm, does not
seem plausible.
A consideration that might provide further evidence against the
coercion view is that compliance in cases of compulsion seems, in
general, much harder to justify than compliance in cases of rob-
bery (24). To see this, imagine we increased the cost of compliance
in both cases: if you comply with “the threat” – i.e., hand over
your money to the robber or use your money to buy something
you don’t need in order to satisfy a compulsive desire – your child
will go hungry for the next 2 weeks since you won’t be able to buy
her enough food. If the coercive threats in these two cases were
no different, we would not expect to see any difference in their
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respective justification of compliance. Arguably, though, there is
such a difference. While it seems likely that most people would
find it unreasonable to expect non-compliance on the part of the
victim to the demands of the robber, it seems much less likely that
they would find it equally unreasonable to expect non-compliance
on the part of the compulsive buyer. If this is correct, people’s
reactive attitudes to the victims of robbers would appear to differ
in important respects from their reactive attitudes to compulsive
buyers.
Even if the desire-centered accounts fail to characterize what
is standardly referred to as compulsive behavior in the clinical
literature, what about the control-centered accounts? Whereas
the desire-centered accounts see compulsion as explained by the
overwhelming force of drug-oriented desires, the control-centered
accounts see it explained by a loss of normal capacities for rational
self-control (14, 17). The difference between the two accounts is
this: the former does not necessarily imply that compulsive peo-
ple have lost their normal capacity for rational self-control. Thus,
someone who fails to resist acting on some desire because of its
abnormal physical strength doesn’t necessarily fail because she has
lost her normal capacity to rational control herself – she may both
possess this capacity and exercise it properly. The reason she fails
is that she is overpowered by the superior force of her compulsive
desire. Compare this with a case in which you are being tossed out
a room by a thug: that you are being tossed out against your will
doesn’t necessarily mean there is anything wrong with your will,
e.g., that you have lost this capacity altogether, or that you have
failed to exercise it properly. It might simply mean that you are
overpowered by your opponent’s superior physical strength (21).
Depending on what is meant by “normal capacity for ratio-
nal self-control,” there might be different views of precisely what
kind of powerlessness the control-centered accounts implicate.
Perhaps the most common is a reasons-based view, according
to which rational self-control is understood in terms of reasons-
responsiveness, and its loss as a lack of susceptibility to counter-
vailing reasons (25–27). That is, someone has lost her capacity
at some time t if a certain sort of counterfactual is true of her:
if she were presented with what she took to be good and suffi-
cient reasons for not performing some compulsive action at t, she
would still perform that action at t. Given standard interpretation
of the truth-conditions of such counterfactuals, it would be liter-
ally impossible for her to successfully resist, no matter what sort
of incentives she is presented with. Does this account succeed in
characterizing what in the clinical literature is standardly referred
to as compulsive behavior?
Once again, there seems to be little reason to assume that it
does. Supportive evidence can be gleaned from the apparent suc-
cess of response prevention therapy as a treatment modality for
OCD. The aim of response prevention therapy is to break the
relationship between the various trigger situations which provoke
the compulsive urge, and the compulsive behavior, by repeatedly
exposing the compulsive person to different trigger situations but
encouraging her to refrain from the compulsive behavior (20).
For example, a compulsive person whose washing rituals are a
result of an obsession about being contaminated by dogs, may be
instructed to pat a dog and then refrain from washing her hands
or to take a bath only after a given period of time. As the sessions
are repeated, the interval is extended. Research shows that if the
pattern is followed in each of the trigger situations, the cumulative
effect is progressively less discomfort and desire to engage in the
compulsive behavior. On the assumption that compulsive behav-
ior involves a complete loss of the normal capacity for rational
self-control, it is difficult to see how compulsive persons could
successfully engage in this kind of exposure therapy. Without that
capacity,how could they possibly comply with instructions to delay
their response to a trigger situation? Inference to the best expla-
nation suggests that they retain their capacities. What response
prevention therapy does is to give them an incentive to put more
effort into exercising them.5
To sum up. If the arguments of this section are correct, the
term “compulsive behavior” as used by the critics of the disease
view is not co-extensional with the term “compulsive behavior” as
it is standardly used in the clinical literature. There is no implicit
or explicit assumption in the clinical literature that compulsive
behavior must be caused by “irresistible desires.” The term “com-
pulsive behavior” simply refers to repetitive behavioral patterns
performed in characteristic circumstances which the compulsive
person finds it difficult to override by intentional effort. On this
description, compulsive persons are not necessarily powerless with
respect to their compulsive behavior. Neither does it rule out the
possibility of this behavior being voluntary, intentional, and even
motivated by the compulsive person’s decision-making processes.
This does not, of course, show that addictive behavior is com-
pulsive. Some critics of the disease view who argue that addictive
behavior is not caused by irresistible desires appear to take this to
suggest that addictions must involve ordinary rational behavior
instead. As we noted above, the latter view has perhaps been most
systematically developed in the economics literature, where so-
called “rational addiction theories” provide the dominant model
of addiction. In the next section, we argue that these theories fail
to explain what is distinctive about addiction.
THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ADDICTION
Viewing addiction merely as a specific pattern of rational choices
obviates the need for a theory of addiction. Addictive behavior
is nothing more than ordinary behavior, and needs no additional
explanation. On the other hand, insofar as addictions typically
involve a small set of substances and activities, these substances
and activities must have something in common that makes an
addictive form of behavior all the more likely. Then again, not
everyone becomes an addict, and systematic differences have been
found between high and low risk individuals. Such regularities
require an explanation: if addictions are constituted by ordinary
rational choices, why do they appear to be different from ordinary
behavior?
One of the most extensively developed attempts to answer this
question was proposed in the theory of rational addiction and its
descendants [e.g., (28–30)]. According to this family of theories,
the peculiar features of addictive behavior derive from the peculiar
5It is worth noting here that not all versions of the control-centered accounts of
compulsivity need be vulnerable to this kind of objection. The version we criticize
is the one that equates compulsivity with a failure of what Fisher and Ravizza refer
to as “strong reasons-responsiveness” (50).
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incentives that can arise when a good has lagged effects. It means in
short that consumption of a good is consumption-for-enjoyment-
now, but also crucially, an investment decision accommodating the
lagged effects the individual expects to enjoy in the future. Given
a particular pattern of short- and long-term effects, such as those
produced by a drug, some consumers find that – for them – the
best consumption plan is gradually to increase consumption to
ever higher levels. These consumers display what the theory labels
“addictions.” On this view addictive behavior is neither paradoxi-
cal nor troublesome. Drug users may be unhappy, but “they would
be even more unhappy if they were prevented from consuming the
addictive goods” (28). Differences between people are due to dif-
ferences in time preferences, available choice sets, or uncertainty:
if drug effects differ across consumers and individuals are uncer-
tain about which effects they should anticipate, they will make a
rational choice under uncertainty which, in the event, may turn
out to be the wrong one, creating a situation where high-level drug
use becomes the optimal way forward (30). Provided the behavior
does not harm others, as Becker and Murphy (28) write, there is no
reason to intervene. An addiction as far as the economic approach
is concerned is simply an unproblematic matter of choice.
This conception of addiction as rational choice must be clearly
distinguished from the view of rational individuals dealing with
addictions. A rational choice proponent need not necessarily see
addictive behavior as rational. They could view addiction as a dis-
ease that hijacked our decision-making apparatus and reduced
our autonomy, so that our rationality would be reduced given an
addiction. However, rational choice would still be involved before
the addiction took hold: the risk of “getting addicted,” the ratio-
nal choice proponent could argue, is a rational choice for some,
involving a trade-off between the risk of losing autonomy on the
one hand, and something else that is valued on the other – plea-
sure, respite from boredom, etc. This, however, would not be a
theory of addiction as such, since it would not explain how or to
what extent addiction reduced the individual’s autonomy.
The theory of rational addiction, by contrast, is a theory of
addiction. To quote Becker and Murphy again, their claim is that
“rational choice theory can explain a wide variety of addictive
behavior.” In addition to intoxicants and cigarettes, they mention
addictions to “work, eating, music, television, their standard of
living, other people, religion, and many other activities.” Their
explanation of such behavior requires goods or activities to have
lagged (i.e., delayed) effects on the user. Addictive goods can be
both beneficial and harmful. Harmful addictions, which are the
most interesting, require that the good or activity has two prop-
erties. First, current consumption reduces your future “baseline”
welfare. A high sugar intake makes you fatter tomorrow, which
you may dislike. Smoking today makes you cough up phlegm the
next morning and feel a bothersome appetite for more cigarettes.
Second, current consumption increases the future value of a unit
of the addictive good itself. If your growing waistline makes you
sad, it gives “comfort food” more sadness to work on. As your
body’s craving for nicotine increases, cigarettes can help satisfy
this renewed urge in addition to giving you the benefits it already
did. As a rational individual, you balance these effects and work
out the plan for future consumption that would maximize your
welfare.
An important but often ignored criticism of the theory of
rational addiction as a theory of how people actually come to be
addicted points to the incredible amount of intricacy all this plan-
ning involves. In deciding whether to smoke a cigarette here and
now, you are actually designing and evaluating a plan on cigarette-
smoking-starting-now-and-far-into-the-future. You take into
account expected changes in smoking legislation, tobacco taxes,
the way current use affects tomorrow’s tastes, uncertainty regard-
ing risks, etc. In this sense, the theory of rational addiction is much
more elaborate than simply positing that individuals respond to
incentives or rationally take into account the possibility of getting
an “addiction-disease.” Instead, according to adherents, addictive
behavior can usefully be viewed as a highly intricate and sophisti-
cated plan that optimally solves a complex decision problem fea-
turing delayed effects and uncertainty. Whether we find this to be
useful will depend essentially on what we want to use the theory for.
EVALUATING THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ADDICTION6
The above description of rational addiction theory may make
it sound “unrealistic,” especially to non-economists. However, as
Mäki (31) warns, “[m]uch of the criticism of economics [. . .] is
based on the mistaken belief that criticism is easy – such as when
inferring from unrealistic assumptions to models being incorrect
[. . .] it is not easy to reliably identify [the] flaws (of economics)
almost regardless of how serious they are.” The reason is that eco-
nomic models can serve a multitude of different aims, and the
criteria against which they should be judged – and the evidence
relevant to judging them – will vary with the aim.
The reason we need to point this out is because economic mod-
els can be insulated from criticism by claiming they are merely
explorations of formal frameworks or false-but-useful ways of
summarizing stylized facts. When we discuss rational addiction
theory, however, we are interested in the theory as an attempt to
explain the underlying causal mechanisms which generate addic-
tive behavior in the real world. This view of the theory is common
both among contributors to the written literature and researchers
working on them: a survey of researchers with peer-reviewed
publications on rational addiction theory found 39% of them
agreeing that the rational addiction literature “provides insights
into how addicts choose that are relevant for psychologists and
treatment professionals,”while 56% agreed that the literature“con-
tains insights on the welfare consequences of addictive goods and
public policies toward these” (32).
This, in our view, is mistaken [see (33, 34) for details and sup-
porting references]. The shortcomings of the theory in this respect
may generalize to other attempts at explaining addictions as ordi-
nary and rational behavior. At a broad level, the problem is that
addictions are characterized by seemingly flip-flopping attitudes
and ambivalence, self-control issues, regret, etc. The addicts fail to
verbalize motives for their actions that would make them under-
standable, sensible, and time-consistent, and in the absence of
simple and recognizable motives for the behavior, the rational
choice believer is compelled to posit ever-subtler, sophisticated
but ultimately non-credible motives and incentives to explain the
6The following discussion is largely based on Rogeberg and Melberg (34), to which
we refer readers who want additional details.
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behavior. Rational addiction theory and its variants exemplify this
problem. They explain addictive behavior patterns as the result
of optimal choices given a specific choice problem. The shape of
the optimal consumption path is determined by the structure and
strength of the lagged and immediate effects of the good, as well as
the consumer’s time preferences and other consumption oppor-
tunities. By varying these and the number of lagged effects we
can generate a variety of consumption paths: rising, falling, cyclic,
chaotic. In other words, the optimal consumption plan is sensitive
to details in the choice problem facing the consumer. Empirically, it
is hard to identify the actual decision problem facing any particular
individual. The incentives consist of the “net” subjective valuation
of a bundle of different effects on health, psyche, etc. In this sense,
the theory “explains” behavior in terms of a detailed hypothesis
about unobservable and non-measurable mental constructs. We
could identify the lagged “effects” of the drugs with more objec-
tively measurable effects, such as those on health, but this will not
solve the problem. The actual lag structures of harmful effects are
unlikely to match the assumptions that generate“typical”addictive
patterns, and the effects on disease risk, the body and future tastes
are not known to the required level of precision in the scientific
literature. Since real addicts are supposed to face and have solved
this decision problem, it is a further problem for the theory that
surveyed individuals state beliefs about lagged effects that are in
clear contradiction with the required assumptions, and it is a fur-
ther problem that even educated experimental subjects generally
fail to find the optimal solution to structurally identical invest-
ment problems in experiments where this could earn them actual
money (35). Put differently: the choice problem that is claimed to
generate addictive behaviors is neither the one individuals actually
face, nor the one they believe themselves to be facing, nor indeed
the one the average smoker or “junkie” is likely to recognize if it
was explained to them, nor a choice problem they would be able
to find the optimal solution to in practice. The “typical” addictive
consumption pattern is more stable over time and across people
than it “should be” according to the theory. The cross-sectional
variation in beliefs about effects of drugs and the time-variation
in knowledge about the effects of drugs should generate a variety
of drug use patterns rather than the ones taken as a stylized fact
by the theory. The theory says that factors X generate Y, but there
is no evidence that X is present where Y is present, and no evi-
dence that experimental manipulations that create factors X lead
to behavior pattern Y. The theory, quite simply, is not credible as a
description of the underlying choice processes generating addic-
tions, and there are no plausible arguments showing why selection
effects or simpler heuristics would allow most people to search for
and implement these optimal paths in alternative ways.7
7In our view the most interesting work on addiction from economists comes from
researchers who try to establish a middle ground between viewing addiction as a dis-
ease that completely removes the addict’s ability to control his behavior and viewing
it as nothing more than an extremely subtle and sophisticated form of maneuvering
undertaken by the addict in the face of complex incentives. Bernheim and Rangel
[(51, 52), see also (53)] have developed a theory, for instance, in which addiction is
the outcome of processes that affect our expectation of pleasure or welfare derived
from using the drug, as well as affecting the likelihood that we will make the con-
sumption decision using a “cold,” rational decision process. Their work can be seen
That addiction involves ordinary rational behavior is not a ten-
able proposition in our view. On the contrary, we believe there
are good reasons to assume that addictive behavior is compulsive
in the clinical sense of the DSM-IV. Yet what DSM-IV gives us is,
of course, a purely descriptive sense of “compulsive.” It does not
explain what makes these behavioral patterns compulsive. If their
compulsivity is not constituted by an irresistible desire for drugs,
what does constitute them? And what kind of evidence would
show that addictive behavior is compulsive? The key to answering
these questions lies neither in the abnormal strength of addictive
desires, we contend, nor in a loss of normal capacities for ratio-
nal self-control, but rather in certain special features intrinsic to
addicts’ decision-making processes.
ADDICTION AND COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR
Compulsion, somewhat paradoxically, seems to involve deliber-
ate, goal-directed behavior caused by something that is external to
the person and independent of practical deliberation. On the one
hand, something seems to assail the person – as if from without.
On the other hand, it is an essentially active phenomenon, a kind
of intentional behavior aimed at altering mood states or regulat-
ing affect. There is, in other words, an appearance of control in
a class of behaviors largely defined by loss of control. We believe
that both these features need to be addressed by our notion of
compulsion. Philosophers, often motivated by a concern with the
metaphysics of free will, have focused exclusively on the apparent
loss of control. However, their picture of compulsive behavior as
motivationally compelled, and of addictive behavior as compul-
sive due to the irresistibility of its psychological antecedents, is
difficult to reconcile with the intentionality and controlled nature
of such actions and with how the term “compulsive behavior” is
applied to clinical cases. Instead, we want to suggest that compul-
sive behavior can be understood in terms of persistent patterns
of failed decision-making caused by a dissociation in the person’s
volitional control. This analysis does not entail that the person
must have lost her capacity to resist. We also believe it fits better
with the application of this notion to clinical cases. If we are on
the right track, then there is good reason to say that one of the
defining features of addiction is precisely its compulsive nature.
It has been common in much philosophy to treat volitional
control as more or less the same as rational self-control, that is,
a capacity persons have to bring their actions into line with what
they judge to have most reason to do. Persons exercise rational self-
control by directing (in various ways) their attention away from
rebellious desires in order to form, retain, or execute intentions to
do what they consider to be the most valuable course of action.
On the assumption that all there is to volitional control is rational
self-control, it follows that a failure of rational self-control nec-
essarily is a failure of volitional control. This has the implication
that when persons’ behavior is “out of control,” it can only be due
to some force over which they have no control, a motivational ele-
ment that is completely external to their volitional capacities, e.g.,
a desire that causes their behavior directly, independently of their
decision-making system.
as an attempt to examine how rational agents would deal with addictions when the
addiction itself is a disturbance of the choice process.
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This conflation of volitional control and rational self-control
makes it hard to handle even standard cases of compulsive behav-
ior. Compulsive persons sometimes make conscious and active
efforts to do the opposite of what they take themselves to have
most reason to do, in some cases by using attention-managing
strategies to block out thoughts about these reasons (36).8 Con-
sider, for example, the sort of ritualistic compulsions typical of
OCD. Persons with OCD tend not to want to be interrupted or
distracted while engaged in these rituals. As we have seen, the clini-
cal literature indicates that they serve a distinct function, namely to
reduce negative feelings. Yet there is no logical connection between
the description under which they intentionally engage in behavior
of this sort (say, checking, hoarding, or washing) and the goal to
which their actions are directed. So while they may make an active
decision and spend considerable effort translating that decision
into action, the behavioral pattern itself seems recruited through
some associative or implicit learning process independent of prac-
tical deliberation and voluntary control. Consequently compulsive
persons often regard their own action as excessive, unpleasant, and
pointless. That is, they do not associate anything pleasurable or
desirable with its performance. It does not seem plausible that
they are driven by a strong cognitive desire to perform it. Nev-
ertheless, they perform it intentionally. They even make an effort
to do it “properly.” Initiating and executing compulsive behav-
ior of this sort clearly require considerable amounts of volitional
control, even though it may involve a failure to pursue what the
compulsive persons themselves consider the most valuable course
of action.9 Rather than being characterized by a loss of volitional
control, therefore,we believe it is more plausible to say that compul-
sive behavior is characterized by a dissociation in volitional control.
This view finds further support in the observation that compul-
sive persons often appear to recognize at the same time as they are
deciding to perform the compulsive action that it is a mistake (“It
is a pointless to wash my hands yet again”), yet go on to intention-
ally form and implement their decision to undertake that action in
spite of these normative considerations. In fact, dissociative expe-
riences, such as feelings of “standing outside oneself while acting,”
are frequently reported across a range of compulsive phenomena,
including addiction to drugs (37). There seems, in other words, to
be a disparity between compulsive persons’ decisions and actions
on the one hand, and their evaluative preferences (what course
of action they judge most valuable) on the other, which can be
explained neither in terms of a failure of volitional control nor in
terms of the abnormal strength of their cognitive desire to engage
in the behavior.10
8This is, of course, not true of all cases of compulsive behavior. Often compulsive
behavior becomes over-learned and automatized as a result of repetition and may
require virtually no active efforts at all (54).
9We can specify the motivational economy in volitional vs. valuational conflicts by
applying the four-type utility framework proposed by Kahneman and colleagues
[see (55)]. In utility-maximizing terms,“volitional” could then be specified in terms
of “decision utility,” and “valuational” in terms of “predicted utility.” See Berridge
and Aldridge (56) for a practical illustration of how this framework can be used to
explain irrational decision-making. Having said that, our general approach does not
depend, we believe, on any specific view of the motivational economy involved.
10Although this conflicts with standard assumptions in economics, there are eco-
nomic models of behavior that break the link between “optimal behavior” and
We believe the possibility of this kind of failed decision-
making – the irrationality of which is displayed in a form of
incoherence in the person’s attitudes – is an essential feature of
compulsive behavior. One way of understanding this phenome-
non is by distinguishing between two ways of making choices.
Postulating the existence of a duality behind people’s choices
is, of course, not new. It has a long history in philosophy and
psychology, reaching back to Aristotle’s distinction between the
rational and non-rational part of the soul.11 While most early
work on this duality was conceptual in nature and based on infor-
mal observations of human behavior and personal introspection,
the development of what have become known as “dual-process
theories” only started with the cognitive revolution in psychology
in the 1960s and 1970s. Experimental studies of attention, learn-
ing, memory, and reasoning were important influences (38). Since
then, a wide variety of evidence has converged on the conclusion
that some sort of dual-process notion is needed to explain how the
overall process of decision-making occurs (39, 40). Unlike before,
we are now beginning to understand the biology and cognitive
structure of the different parts (41). According to dual-process
theory, decision-making can broadly be divided into two modes,
one fast, intuitive, and effortless shaped by biology and implicit
learning, the other slow, analytical, and effortful shaped by culture
and formal tuition. While the former mode – in the dual-process
literature often referred to as type-1 processes – depends on envi-
ronmental cues, is associative, automatic, and can control behavior
directly without need for controlled attention, the latter – often
referred to as type-2 processes – depends on de-contextualization,
is rule-based and requires controlled attention and effort. There
is much disagreement about precisely how these processes should
be characterized and distinguished (39, 42). We cannot enter into
this debate here. For present purposes, what matters is that dual-
process theory allows a closer scrutiny of the vulnerable aspects of
the decision-making process by permitting focus on the important
ways in which the different modes of decision-making interact.
To achieve rational decision-making the two modes have to
work well together to reliably contribute to the person’s goal
achievement (43). This requires two things. First, that the per-
son’s type-2 process can exert an executive function and override
the impulsive output of her type-1 process. For this to happen,
her type-2 process must be able to generate a more considered
response that is in line with her normative reasons, as well as
involve inhibitory mechanisms to suppress the response tenden-
cies of her type-1 process. Second, it requires that the person’s
“actual behavior” by including preferences or psychological quirks that are incon-
sistent with a pure rational choice model [see e.g., (51)]. In a pure rational choice
model, the chosen action will always be optimal (or optimal by expectation), which
“allows” the researcher to infer the welfare-determining preferences from the behav-
ior (i.e., revealed preferences). With this link broken, the researcher has to provide a
higher level of evidential support for the theoretical assumptions themselves, while
welfare analyses need to distinguish between different concepts of welfare or“utility,”
for instance along the lines of Kahneman et al. (55).
11“For in the continent and the incontinent person we praise their reason, i.e., the
[part] of the soul that has reason, because it exhorts them correctly and toward
what is best; but they evidently also have in them some other [part] that is by
nature something besides reason, conflicting and struggling with reason.” (57),
1102b 15–20.
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type-1 process selects adequate and relevant information about the
practical situation that can provide input for her type-2 process
(41). There is widespread agreement that some form of auto-
matic, pre-conscious processing determines the person’s locus of
attention and what stored memories and beliefs are recalled for as
relevant to her current situation. This suggests that the person’s
normative reasons (represented in her type-2 process) might be
shaped, even to a significant degree, by type-1 encoding of infor-
mation about which aspects of the situation need to be taken into
account, and which can be ignored.12
Given this view of rational decision-making, failed decision-
making can be seen to arise in two ways. One might be if the
decision-making process of either type is internally biased. This
could be the result of either an under or over appreciation of cer-
tain contextual cues, a failure to ignore distracting features, or a
process for combining and processing information that uses sim-
plified algorithms with potential biases. If a type-1 process fails to
encode relevant information, or encodes irrelevant information
that enters into the person’s subsequent analytic type-2 process, it
may cause blindness to special circumstances or to longer-range
goals. In consequence the person’s flexibility to be able to con-
sider alternative reasons for acting is systematically undermined.
Decision-making can also fail if a conflict arises between type-1
and type-2 processes. In the standard scenario, the person fails to
suppress an intuitive but non-normative response generated by her
type-1 process despite the fact that it conflicts with a considered
normative response generated by her type-2 process. In contrast
with cases of internally biased decision-making, the possibility of
such executive failures implies that the person may be consciously
aware while making her decision that it is mistaken. There seems
to be no clear reason to assume that executive failures of this sort
must presuppose that the person has any abnormally strong cog-
nitive desire to respond in line with her type-1 process or has lost
her ability to refrain from responding in this way. Rather, the fail-
ure is simply one of putting insufficient effort into overriding a
type-1 process. That such failures occasionally occur should not
surprise us given the cue-dependency, computational speed, and
dissociated nature of type-1 processes. These decision processes
plug more or less directly into the person’s motor system and
seem almost to have “actional” character. Type-2 processes, on the
other hand, require an effort that tires the person and may make it
harder to engage in type-2 reasoning and override type-1 processes
resulting in so-called “decision-fatigue” (5, 44).
We believe it is plausible that compulsive behavior involves
persistent patterns of failed decision-making in one or the other
of these two senses.13 In the former, a mis-contextualization of
12A difficult philosophical issue concerns the account of the self and its rationality
in face of the conflict described by dual-process theory. According to one influential
view, we should identify the self with the “better” type-2 processes because only on
this level do we notice and are bothered by a lack of rational integration (58). While
we cannot address all the issues raised by this claim at this juncture [but see (43) for
a discussion], for present purposes, we assume that in (at least) standard cases, the
self is associated with type-2 processing.
13One important implication of a dual-process approach to decision-making is that
each one of us is potentially vulnerable to developing compulsive behavioral pat-
terns, including addictions. Redish and colleagues propose a variant of this approach
as a unified framework for addiction where they distinguish between 10 different
information enters into the person’s subsequent analytic type-
2 process and causes a biased response, and in the latter, there
is an executive failure to appropriately engage type-2 processes
or use their output to override the impulsive output of a type-1
process. In either case, when failed decision-making occurs repet-
itively, leading to a maladaptive behavioral pattern deserving of
the label “compulsive,” it is plausibly because some type-1 process
has become fixed in inert dispositions and patterns of perception
and response. Presumably, there is some underlying cue-triggered
motivational mechanism which – perhaps due to repetition and
reinforcement – has become deeply entrenched. In cases where
there is subjective experience of conflict, this mechanism repeat-
edly pulls the person’s decisions away from her evaluative prefer-
ences. In cases where there is no subjective experience of conflict,
she may be led to consistently ignore special circumstances or
longer-range goals and hence systematically undermine her abil-
ity to consider alternative reasons for acting.14 Whether or not
there is an experience of conflict in a particular case may be a mat-
ter of the psychological resources of the individual (e.g., insight vs.
tendency to rationalize or confabulate reasons for actions gener-
ated by her type-1 process). In either case, the persons’maladaptive
behavioral patterns may counterfactually depend on the same type
of entrenched motivational mechanism.
If this general picture of compulsivity is on the right track,
is there any reason to believe that addiction involves compulsive
behavior?15 The best reason is that addictive behavior appears to
be strongly cue-dependent (9, 45), and that addicts regularly and
systematically fail to take advantage of alternatives to drugs in spite
of negative consequences for themselves, and often in spite of what
they judge to be the most valuable course of action (11). There is
a tendency for addicts to systematically ignore or downplay the
costs of taking drugs while greatly exaggerating its benefits (4). As
George Ainslie has argued, addicts often frame their decisions tem-
porally as repeated, independent choices between alternatives one
at a time on the basis of their immediate costs and benefits, rather
than as single choices over series of similar alternatives across time
on the basis of their summed costs and benefits (46). In such cases
the addict’s decision-making process is clearly biased since she
concentrates too much on the immediate benefits of drugs and
systematically ignores her longer-range goals. From a conceptual
point of view, what could explain such biasing within a dual-
process approach is that a drug-oriented type-1 process – due to
failure points in our decision-making system, each of which may be capable of dri-
ving a person to make addictive decision “mistakes.” The reason some people go
on to develop addictions while others do not depends on the specific “interaction
between the genetics of the individual, the developmental environment (social and
physical), the developmental stage of the individual, and the behavioral experience
with the addictive substance” [(59), 430].
14In the social cognition literature, one variant of this phenomenon is referred to
as “cognitive narrowing,” which is a tendency to focus attention on an immediate,
concrete, low-level task (e.g., shopping or buying) that prevents consideration of
the longer term consequences of an action (36).
15One interesting issue concerns how this picture of compulsivity relates to the
defects in action and agency discussed in the philosophical literature as “weakness
of will” [see e.g., (60)]. Although we cannot address this issue here (the relevant
literature is voluminous), one of the authors has argued elsewhere that there are
some important differences between addiction/compulsion and weakness of will.
See Henden (61).
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the entrenchment of some underlying cue-triggered motivational
mechanism – has become fixed in a pattern of perception and
response that systematically fails to encode logically relevant infor-
mation about drug-related situations. When such drug-oriented
type-1 processes regularly shape the content and locus of attention
of a person’s subsequent analytic type-2 processes, they cause the
rate at which she discounts the value of future rewards, such as,
e.g., the benefits of abstinence, to increase drastically relative to
the rate at which she discounts consumption. The result is that
when opportunities for consumption arise, the person’s estimate
of their values has increased so much more relative to her esti-
mate of the value of abstinence that her preference reverses. But
in addition to such cases of so-called “hyperbolic discounting” we
believe (more controversially) that there is also evidence of cases
in which addicts fail to take advantage of alternatives to drugs
in spite of judging, at the moment of choice, that the value of
abstaining is higher than the value of consumption. In these cases
the problem is not internal biasing of analytic type-2 processes,
but rather a regular failure to override type-1 processes which sys-
tematically fail to encode relevant information about drug-related
situations.
Evidence of such dual-process conflicts in addiction comes
from the observation that many addicts appear to make con-
scious and strenuous efforts to exercise restraint at the same time
as they are seeking or actually taking drugs. As addiction researcher
Robert West puts it: “When the restraint fails, there is often (but
not always) no sense of the addict having changed his mind and
deciding to engage in the behavior as a positive step; rather the
sense is of a failure to exert control followed by regret and a
feeling of having let oneself down” (47). As neuroscientists Kent
Berridge and Terry E. Robinson note in a similar vein, there is
plenty of evidence that addicts often continue to seek and take
drugs even when no pleasure can be obtained, even in the absence
of withdrawal – even – in fact when they are convinced that taking
drugs is a disastrous course of action for them (11). Addicts, this
would suggest, will often continue to judge that abstaining is the
most valuable course of action even as they are carrying out their
drug-oriented behavior.
What explains these kinds of systematic errors in drug-oriented
decision-making? Specifying the nature of the underlying mecha-
nism(s) is an important component of the empirical explanation
of the compulsive character of addictive behavior. Our aim in this
article has not been to propose any such explanation, but to suggest
how to make conceptually sense of the “compulsive character” of
behavior in a way that does not depend on the notion of irresistible
desire and, in addition, to provide evidence in support of the view
that addictive behavior is compulsive in this sense. That being
said, an example of a mechanism that seems to fit well with the
dual-process analysis of compulsivity is that proposed by Berridge
and Robinson in their influential work on incentive-sensitization.
Incentive-sensitization is a mechanism whereby repeated drug use
produces a dopaminergic response that becomes sensitized by
causing certain regions in the brain involved in the motivation of
behavior to be more easily activated by drugs or drug-related cues
independent of the addict’s cognitive desires, judgments, or “lik-
ings.”In a series of papers Berridge and Robinson provide evidence
that the psychological process and neural substrate responsible
for determining cognitive-affective liking are separable from the
psychological process and neural substrate responsible for deter-
mining incentive salience – the degree to which a goal or stimulus
is action-driving – or what they call “wanting” (48). While nor-
mally “liking” and “wanting” go together so that we “want” the
things we “like” (e.g., the hedonic value associated with some envi-
ronmental cue or circumstance serves as a trigger to activate and
direct “wanting”), in addiction they come apart, making addicts
“want”things they do not“like.”The reason incentive-sensitization
might give us an empirical explanation of why addictive behav-
ior is compulsive in the sense we have characterized compulsivity
in this article is that it might explain why addicts’ drug-oriented
type-1 processes become fixed in inert dispositions and patterns
of perception and response which lead to systematically biasing
of their type-2 processes or to the creation of regular conflicts
between their type-1 and type-2 processes. Continuous failures to
override type-1 processes that are dependent on an entrenched
motivational mechanism like incentive-sensitization arise since
these processes are difficult to override by intentional effort due
to their cue-dependency, computational speed and frequency, and
because addicts simply put insufficient effort into overriding them
(perhaps due to decision-fatigue, misjudgment, or some other rea-
son).16 This, of course, is perfectly consistent with the common
observation that quitting drugs is hard if you are an addict, but
without entailing that this is because addicts are driven by irre-
sistible desires for drugs or have lost their powers of resistance. A
dual-process analysis of the notion of compulsivity does not, there-
fore, rule out the intentionality of addictive behavior. However,
nor does it rule out the possibility that some other psychological
or neurological mechanism (or combination of mechanisms) than
incentive-sensitization might in the end turn out to provide the
best empirical explanation of the compulsive behavior of human
addicts (or at least be part of such an explanation).17 Ultimately,
it is a matter for the sciences to decide the precise nature of the
relevant mechanism(s) which create(s) persistent dissociations in
addicts’ decision-making machinery – or indeed of any of the
various mechanisms that might be responsible for the different
compulsive disorders.
CONCLUSION
The question posed in the title of this article would seem to neces-
sitate an either/or answer: either addiction involves voluntary,
chosen behavior and is therefore not compulsive or it involves
16It is worth noting that this view of compulsivity, in relying on the notion of
“level of effort” rather than “motivational irresistibility,” implies that compulsivity
is a matter of degree. It is consistent, therefore, with the possibility of differences
between forms of compulsive behavior in terms of how difficult they are to resist, e.g.,
between the kinds of behavior seen in, say, OCD and in the different addictions. For
more on the conceptual connection between effort expenditure and compulsivity,
see Henden (61).
17The incentive-sensitization theory of addiction remains controversial. Most of the
data supporting it come from laboratory animal studies with little consideration of
the social context in which the drugs were administered. This has caused some to
criticize the theory for failing to generalize to human addicts [for a recent discussion,
see (62)]. There is also evidence suggesting that incentive-sensitization by itself is
not sufficient to create repetitive drug-oriented behavior in animals if they are given
more options [see (63)]. For replies to some of these criticisms, see Robinson and
Berridge (64); Robinson et al. (65).
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compulsion and therefore is not voluntary, chosen behavior. The
bone of contention over which the respective proponents of the
medical and the moral model of addiction do battle seems to rely
in large part on the assumed contradiction between these two
answers. The normative implications are obviously deep and far-
reaching. If addiction rules out voluntary behavior and choice,
then addicts can only (at best) be indirectly responsible for their
drug use. That widens the scope for public policy interventions.
If, by contrast, addiction involves voluntary, chosen behavior, this
scope for intervention will be correspondingly constrained. Our
aim in this article has been to argue that a middle path is not only
possible but actually quite plausible in the light of the evidence:
behavior can be voluntary, chosen, and compulsive at the same
time. One way of making conceptual sense of this is to assume that
our decision-making system is divisible. If such divisions stabilize
due to the entrenchment of some underlying motivational mech-
anism and cause regular and systematic failures in the person’s
decision-making with respect to actions of a certain type, they
create compulsive behavioral patterns that may be very difficult
for her to override by intentional effort alone. There are many
good reasons, in our opinion, to believe that addictions essen-
tially depend on such divisions in the decision-making system of
addicts. However, this view does not mean that it is literally impos-
sible for addicts to refrain from drugs. It only means it is much
harder for them than it is for people who are not addicted. Even
heavily addicted individuals have the capacity to abstain, although
they may need help to learn how to exercise that capacity properly.
We believe this mix of the “moral” and the “medical” model of
addiction may open up for a more nuanced approach to many of
the pressing normative issues raised by public policies, practices,
and treatments in the addiction field.
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